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Abstract
We present an experiment where subjects sequentially receive signals about the true 
state of the world and need to form beliefs about which one is true, with payoffs 
related to reported beliefs. We attempt to control for risk aversion using the Offer-
man et al. (Rev Econ Stud 76(4):1461–1489, 2009) technique. Against the baseline 
of Bayesian updating, we test for belief adjustment underreaction and overreaction 
and model the decision making process of the agent as a double hurdle model where 
agents with inferential expectations first decide whether to adjust their beliefs and 
then, if so, decide by how much. We also test the effects of increased inattention 
and complexity on belief updating. We find evidence for periods of belief inertia 
interspersed with belief adjustment. This is due to a combination of random belief 
adjustment; state-dependent belief adjustment, with many subjects requiring consid-
erable evidence to change their beliefs; and quasi-Bayesian belief adjustment, with 
aggregate insufficient belief adjustment when a belief change does occur. Inatten-
tion, like complexity, makes subjects less likely to adjust their stated beliefs, while 
inattention additionally discourages full adjustment.
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1 Introduction
Agents form and update their beliefs when they receive new information. In the 
presence of rational expectations, new information leads to belief updating every 
period according to Bayes rule. In reality many agents do not behave according to 
basic statistics, and task complexity and inattention may contribute to deviations 
from Bayesian predictions. Such violations of rational expectations have been stud-
ied in static settings, where all the information is presented at once to subjects who 
discount priors (Kahneman and Tversky 1973; Tversky and Kahneman 1982; El-
Gamal and Grether 1995). In this paper we study a dynamic setting in which new 
information arrives sequentially and consider the frequency as well as the extent 
of belief adjustment, referring to sticky belief adjustment when it is insufficient in 
either domain.
Relative to previous urn experiments where agents need to state guesses, such 
as Khaw et al. (2017), our study is innovative in a number of dimensions. First, it 
is simple, in that our experiment does not have an evolving state of nature. We are 
interested instead in the basic question of how beliefs are updated dynamically, and 
this basic question can be answered in a way that is easiest for experimental par-
ticipants and most interpretable for researchers by having a simple dynamic envi-
ronment with new information flowing in. Second, we attempt to control for risk 
aversion and therefore are able to measure beliefs more accurately than in previous 
research. We try to do so by using the Offerman et  al.’s (2009) technique. Third, 
we do not use cumulative earnings, which may lead to uncontrolled factors such as 
income effects or portfolio diversification.
Fourth, we develop a double hurdle econometric model to combine in a single 
framework different types of belief adjustment we may observe in the laboratory: 
time-dependent (random) belief adjustment and state-dependent (Bayesian, Quasi-
Bayesian) belief adjustment.1 Each type has been utilized in macro and microeco-
nomic modelling, though the tendency has been to focus on only one type.
Within macroeconomic research, sticky belief adjustment can be seen as a pos-
sible microfoundation of sticky price adjustment, for example as a result of inat-
tention and observation costs (Alvarez et  al. 2016), information costs (Abel et  al. 
2013), cognitive costs (Magnani et  al. 2016) and the consultation of experts by 
inattentive agents (Carroll 2003), or some combination of these factors (Cohen 
et  al. 2019). State-dependence in beliefs implies a dependence of belief adjust-
ment on the economic state, which in turn may depend on new information flow-
ing in. Time-dependence in beliefs is often viewed stochastically [as for example in 
Caballero (1989)] and therefore yields random belief adjustment, following some 
underlying data generating process. One useful way of conceptualizing state- and 
1 None of these points should be interpreted as criticisms of regime switching studies such as Khaw 
et al. (2017). The focus of these studies is on getting a better understanding of how agents handle regime 
switching, and so an evolving economy or a more specialised modelling approach are appropriate for 
what they are trying to achieve, and potentially confounding factors (such as risk aversion) are less of an 
issue than they are when trying to get a basic understanding of belief updating. The latter is our different 
and more fundamental focus.
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time-dependent beliefs is the inferential expectations (IE) model of Menzies and 
Zizzo (2009): that is, agents hold a belief until enough evidence has accumulated 
for a statistical test of a given test size  to become significant, at which point beliefs 
switch. Furthermore, if agents’ stance towards evidence is modelled by a probabilis-
tic draw on their  , then the probability that the test size is unity (which results in an 
update for any evidence, or none2) is the probability of a random belief adjustment.
Within microeconomic research, Quasi-Bayesian (QB) belief adjustment has 
been the preferred route to think about bounded-rational belief adjustment. Rabin 
(2013) distinguishes between warped Bayesian models which encapsulate a false 
model of how signals are generated, for example ignoring the law of large numbers 
(Benjamin et al. 2015); and information-misreading Bayesian models that misinter-
pret signals as supporting agents’ hypotheses, thus giving rise to confirmation bias 
(Rabin and Schrag 1999), and therefore lead to underweighting of information (for 
early evidence, see Phillips and Edwards 1966). In static problems where priors and 
‘new information’ were given, Kahneman and Tversky (1973) and Tversky and Kah-
neman (1982) made the contrasting finding of base rate neglect, with more weight 
being put on the new information; reviews of the literature on base rate neglect can 
be found in Koehler (1996), Barbey and Sloman (2007) and Benjamin (2019). One 
simple way of modelling QB adjustment, which we follow, is that the agent adjusts 
beliefs every period in response to new information, but this adjustment is either too 
big or too small (Massey and George 2005; Ambuehl and Li 2014). That is, if the 
posterior probability is the prior multiplied by (likelihood) , Quasi-Bayesian models 
are marked by departures of  from unity.3
In this paper we use a double hurdle model to consider different perspectives 
about belief adjustment emphasized within macro- and microeconomics. Full ration-
ality requires clearing two hurdles in a very specific way: fully rational agents must 
adjust every period as they clear hurdle 1, and they must use Bayes rule with  = 1 
as they clear hurdle 2.
Table 1 describes the first hurdle using different values of the IE test size (  ) and 
the columns describe the second hurdle using different values of the QB parameter 
 . Fully rational agents are fully attentive (  = 1 ) and Bayesian (  = 1 ). The double 
hurdle model is formalized in Sect.  4.2 and generates a distribution for  and  , 
parameterizing both the frequency and extent of adjustment.
Fifth, we provide the first study that looks at how increased task complexity or 
scope for inattention affects belief updating. Task complexity and inattention are two 
factors that have been independently identified as playing a potentially substantial 
role in bounded-rational decision making.
2 A standard (Neyman–Pearson) hypothesis test minimizes the probability of falsely believing a null (a 
type II error) subject to an upper bound on the probability of falsely rejecting that same null (a type I 
error). If  is unity, the constraint does not bind, so the best way to minimize the probability of falsely 
believing a null is to automatically (for any evidence against it, or none) reject the null. Under IE, reject-
ing a null is the same as ‘updating’ because a new value has to be chosen.








 is sometimes called the likeli-
hood.
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Among others, Simon (1979), Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier (2011) and Caplin 
et al. (2011) have identified complexity of decision settings as a key reason for ‘sat-
isficing’ and heuristic-based decision making. This is neurobiologically plausible 
(Bossaerts and Murawski 2017) and leads to different ways information is processed 
(Payne 1979) and lotteries selected in binary choices (Wilcox 1993). Examples of 
practical applications where complexity can be important is consumer exploitation 
by firms to achieve greater profits (Carlin 2011; Huck et al. 2011; Sitzia and Zizzo 
2011; Sitzia et al. 2015); decisions to engage in vertical integration or outsourcing 
(Tadelis 2002); climate change inaction as linked to the complexity of the relevant 
task environment (Slawinski et al. 2017); defaults becoming more attractive as an 
omission bias (e.g., Baron and Ritov 2004).
Inattention has been independently identified as a key source of bounded-rational 
decision making (e.g., Alvarez et al. 2016; Magnani et al. 2016; Carroll 2003), in 
ways that may but do not necessarily reflect rational inattention trade-offs. (See 
Caplin et al. 2020, for a discussion of this point.) It has a wide ranging and grow-
ing set of applications. Examples of applications in macroeconomics include the 
New Keynesian Philips Curve (Mankiw and Reis 2002), business cycle dynamics 
(Mackowiak and Wiederholt 2015) and the failure of uncovered interest rate parity 
(Bacchetta and van Wincoop 2010). Examples of applications in microeconomics 
include strategic product pricing (Martin 2017), corporate strategy (Dessein et  al. 
2016) and portfolio selection (Huang and Liu 2007).
Surprisingly, given the importance that both complexity and inattention have 
been stated to have in a wide range of settings with risk and imperfect information, 
we are not aware of papers that have looked at the effect of either on belief updating. 
A key contribution of this paper is to address this gap.
Regarding task complexity, we expect it to potentially reduce the frequency of 
stated belief changes in the first hurdle (  in Table 1) as well as the extent of the 
stated belief change when this takes place in the second hurdle (  in Table 1). This 
is because complexity makes subjects less likely to wish to make an ‘active’ choice 
and therefore more likely to stick to the default (see Gerasimou 2018); and because, 
if they do change their stated beliefs, as they perceive the task as more uncertain, 
they are likely to be more conservative in the degree to which they do so (see Brain-
ard 1967).
Regarding inattention, if it matters in the way that the literature has suggested, 
then a simple experimental manipulation increasing the likelihood of inattention 
will lead experimental subjects to be less likely to update their beliefs regarding the 
variable to which they are not paying attention. Importantly, while this would not 
be surprising if the alternative distracting task were incentivized, in our experiment 
(as in Sitzia et al. (2015)) it is not. There is therefore unlikely to be any preference-
based reason why a rational agent should ignore the guessing task on the basis of 
which payments are wholly made, and deviations from Bayes can be more precisely 
identified as being due to cognitive costs in information processing. Inattention 
should reduce the likelihood of agents switching their belief, and therefore enter the 
first hurdle of the model.
In brief, our results are as follows. Subjects change their beliefs about half the 
time, which is consistent with random belief adjustment, but they also consider the 
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amount of evidence available, which is consistent with state-dependent belief adjust-
ment. When subjects do change beliefs, they do so by around 80 per cent of the 
full Bayesian update, which is consistent with our version of Quasi-Bayesian belief 
adjustment. There is substantial heterogeneity in our results and the frequency and 
extent of belief adjustment are negatively correlated: agents who update with low fre-
quency do so by more than 80 percent of the full Bayesian update. Furthermore, we 
find evidence that inattention reduces the propensity to update, as predicted, as well 
as the extent of update. Complexity is less important, as it only affects the propensity 
to update and does so by less than inattention. We do not find that task confusion 
explains belief stickiness to an important degree, nor is there any financial incentive 
to explain why beliefs are stickier if we add an alternative distracting task. Rather, 
inattention and cognitive costs are likely to explain the infrequent belief adjustment, 
to different degrees, by half of our subjects. Only a small fraction of agents have 
rational expectations where that is understood as full Bayesian updating each period.
Our paper is structured as follows: in Sect. 2 we construct a balls-and-urn experi-
ment with treatments for complexity and inattention. Section 3 describes the balls-
and-urn environment, and predicts behavior, under different expectational assump-
tions. Section 4 analyzes the experimental results using: nonparametric (model free) 
statistics for the raw data; the double hurdle econometric model for the risk-adjusted 
data; and a subject-specific density of test sizes derived from the double hurdle 
model. Section 5 draws together the main results, and concludes.
2  Experimental design and treatments
Our experiment was fully computerized in JavaScript and run with undergraduate 
and postgraduate students in the experimental laboratory of the University of East 
Anglia with n = 245 subjects in 16 sessions conducted between July and December 
2013.4 Everyone in each session participated in the same treatment, and sessions 
were conducted in mixed order. ORSEE was used as experimental recruitment soft-
ware for the assignment of subjects to sessions. Subjects were separated by parti-
tions. The experiment was divided in two parts, labelled the risk attitude part (Stage 
1) and the main part (Stage 2).
Table 1  Updating taxonomy
4 Dates, times and treatments of experimental sessions are listed in online appendix 2.
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Experimental instructions were provided at the beginning of each part for the 
tasks in that part. Online appendices 3 and 4 contain a copy of the instructions; a 
file with more details on the software and with computer screens is also provided as 
supplementary material. A questionnaire was administered to ensure understanding 
after each batch of instructions. If a subject got an answer wrong, a brief and simple 
explanation was provided explaining the correct answer (see the computer screens 
file for the text in each case) and, if anything was still unclear, subjects were given 
the opportunity to obtain further clarification from an experimenter.
2.1  Main part of the experiment
After playing the risk attitude part described in more detail below, in the main part 
of the experiment subjects played 7 stages, each with 8 rounds, thus generating 
T = 56 observations. At the beginning of each stage the computer randomly chose 
one of two urns (Urn 1 or Urn 2), with Urn 1 being selected at a known probability 
of 0.6. Each urn represents a different state of the world. While this prior probability 
was known and it was known that the urn would remain the same throughout the 
stage, the chosen urn was not known to subjects. It was known that Urn 1 had seven 
white balls and three orange balls, and Urn 2 had three white balls and seven orange 
balls. At the beginning of each of the 8 rounds (round = t), there was a draw from 
the chosen urn (with replacement) and subjects were told the color of the drawn ball. 
These were therefore signals that could be used by subjects to update their beliefs.5 
It was made clear to the subjects that the probability an urn was chosen in each of 
the seven stages was entirely independent of the choices of urns in previous stages. 
A visual representation of the urns was provided on the computer screens to facili-
tate understanding (see the computer screens file).
Once they saw the draw for the round, subjects were asked to make a probability 
guess between 0 and 100%, on how likely it was that the chosen urn was Urn 1. The 
corresponding variable for analysis is their probability guess expressed as a propor-
tion, denoted g. Once a round was completed, the following round started with a 
new ball draw, up to the end of the 8th round.
Payment for the main part of the experiment was based on the guess made in a 
randomly chosen stage and round picked at the end of the experiment. A standard 
quadratic scoring rule (e.g. Davis and Holt 1993) was used in relation to this round 
to penalize incorrect answers. The payoff for each subject was equal to 18 GBP 
minus 18 GBP × (guess − correct probability)2 . Therefore, for the randomly cho-
sen stage and round, subjects could earn between 0 and 18 GBP depending on the 
accuracy of their guesses. It was clarified to subjects that “if the chosen urn was Urn 
1, then the correct probability of the chosen urn being Urn 1 is 100%; if the chosen 
urn was Urn 2, then the correct probability of the chosen Urn being Urn 1 is 0%”. 
While instructions were generally provided on the computer screen, a table with 
payoffs for each level of accuracy of the guesses was provided in print, to facilitate 
5 All signals are thus informative. It would be an interesting extension to include non-informative signals 
in future research.
1 3
Belief adjustment: a double hurdle model and experimental…
understanding (see online appendix 3). Table  8 in “Appendix  5: Robustness and 
understanding” includes a regression model with maths ability as an explanatory 
variable, which we measure in the C treatment. This variable is insignificant even in 
the treatment where potentially it should have mattered the most, which undermines 
its relevance. Furthermore, subjects could make use of a calculator. Specifically, a 
‘calculate consequences’ button gave subjects ready information about the payoffs 
arising from their guess, depending on which urn was drawn.
2.2  Risk attitude part of the experiment
The risk attitude part was similar to the main part but simpler and therefore genu-
inely useful as practice. It was modelled after Offerman et al. (2009) to enable us to 
infer people’s risk attitude, as detailed in Sect. 3.
It consisted of 10 stages with one round each. In each stage a new urn was drawn 
(with probabilities 0.05, 0.1, 0.15, 0.2, 0.25, 0.75, 0.8, 0.85, 0.9, 0.95).6 Subjects 
were told the prior probability of Urn 1 being chosen but did not receive any further 
information. In particular, no balls were drawn. The guessing task (single round) 
was to nominate a probability that Urn 1 was chosen, where subjects could rely on 
the information available to them and the payment mechanism to identify which 
probability guess would maximize their expected utility. For subjects who are not 
risk neutral, the task is non-trivial as they should take account of the payoff structure 
rather than repeat the announced probabilities. Payment for the risk attitude of the 
experiment was based on the guess made in a randomly chosen round picked at the 
end of the experiment. A quadratic scoring rule was applied as in the main part, but 
this time this was equal to 3 GBP minus 3 GBP × (guess − correct probability)2.7 
Again, it was clarified to subjects that the correct probability was 0 or 1 depending 
on the urn being chosen, and again a table with payoffs for each level of accuracy of 
the guesses was provided in print (see online appendix 3) and a calculator was also 
available.
6 One might wonder why we did not use 0.6 as a possible value. The purpose of the risk attitude part is 
to estimate  by the auxiliary regression in “Appendix 3: Method for estimating CRRA risk parameter”, 
and so it is desirable to have values close to 0 and 1, since the standard error in a regression is inversely 
related to the standard deviation of the independent variable. Adding extra values in the middle of the 
range of the independent variable may be useful for some purposes, but it would have a low leverage and 
therefore not help much in this context. This is not to deny that more data is always better than less, but 
0.6 was not a natural choice for extra data. Furthermore, at the point in time when the subjects do the risk 
attitude part, the number 0.6 had no special significance for them; and we wished to avoid the danger of 
subjects potentially artificially anchoring in the main part to what they had done under 0.6 in the risk 
attitude part.
7 This ensured similar marginal incentives for each round in the risk attitude part (3 GBP prize picked up 
from 1 out of 10 rounds) and the main part (18 GBP prize picked up from 1 out of 56 rounds).
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2.3  Experimental treatments
There were three treatments. The risk attitude parts were identical across all treat-
ments, and the main part of the Baseline treatment (B) was as described.
In the main part (only) of the Complexity treatment (C), the information on the 
ball drawn from the chosen urn at the beginning of each round was presented as a 
statement about whether the sum of three numbers (of three digits each) is true or 
false. If true (e.g., 731 + 443 + 927 = 2101 ), this meant that a white ball was drawn. 
If false (e.g., 731 + 443 + 927 = 2121 ), this meant that an orange ball was drawn.
In the main part (only) of the Inattention treatment (I), subjects were given a non-
incentivized alternative counting task which they could do instead of working on the 
probability. The counting task was a standard one from the real effort experimental 
literature (see Abeler et al. 2011, for an example) and consisted in counting the num-
ber of 1s in matrices of 0s and 1s. Subjects were told that they could do this exercise 
for as little or as long as they liked within 60 s for each round, and that we were not 
asking them in any way to engage in this exercise at all unless they wanted to.8
As in Caplin et al. (2020) and the key treatments in Sitzia et al. (2015), we see as 
important not to incentivize the alternative task. If the alternative task were incen-
tivized—financially or in terms of doing something fun such as browsing the inter-
net—, it would be rational for an agent to split his or her time allocation between 
tasks, which would trivially imply worse decision making in the guessing task. This 
would make it difficult to precisely identify what is due to inattention as a psycho-
logical mechanism, and could be construed to simply reflect the fact that agents 
are bad at multitasking (e.g., Buser and Peter 2012). In our setting, instead, agents 
should just focus on a single task and not be distracted by the alternative task.9 
Undoubtedly, future research could change the incentives associated to the alterna-
tive task.
3  Theoretical model
3.1  Model variables and risk attitude correction
In this section, we build a model of subject play in our experiment where the key 
driver is the way subjects form beliefs. Table 2 lays out the main variables from the 
experiment and the interrelationships between them, when the event is described in 
terms of the chosen urn (row 1) and when it is described in terms of the probabil-
ity of a white ball being drawn (row 2). The two descriptions are equivalent since 
8 They were also told that, if they did not make a guess in the guessing task within 60  s, they would 
automatically keep the guess from the previous round and move to the next round (or to the next stage). 
The length of 60 s was chosen based on piloting, in such a way that this would not be a binding con-
straint if subjects focused on the guessing task.
9 In their experiment on the selection of energy tariffs, Sitzia et al. (2015) did not find different results 
when the alternative task was the ability to browse the internet instead of a counting task like the one in 
this paper.
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the subject’s subjective guess of the probability that Urn 1 was chosen generates 
an implied subjective probability that a white ball is drawn.10 In our modelling of 
this experimental environment, we sometimes use the former probability—that Urn 
1 was chosen—and it will be useful to transform this probability guess using the 
inverse cumulative Normal distribution (so that the support has the same dimension-
ality as a classic z-statistic). Alternatively, we sometimes describe agents’ guesses 
in terms of the probability that a white ball is drawn because the sample proportion 
from repeated Bernoulli trials has a tractable sampling distribution for hypothesis 
testing.
Time is measured by t, the draw (round) number for the ball draws in each stage. 
We define the value of t for which subjects last moved their guess (viz. updated their 
beliefs) to be m (for ‘last move’). Thus, for any sequence of ball draws at time t, the 
time that has elapsed since the last change in the guess is always t − m.
Along the top row the theoretical estimator for the probability that Urn 1 was 
drawn is provided by Bayes rule, which we denote by Pt after t ball draws. Many 
subjects do not use Bayes rule when they are guessing the probability that Urn 1 is 
chosen, though some guesses are closer to it than others.
As derived in Offerman et al. (2009), the elicited guess gt in the fourth column is 
the result of maximizing expected utility based on a Constant Relative Risk Aver-
sion (CRRA) utility function, U{Payoff}:

















where the payoffs for Urn 1 and Urn 2 are proportional to 1 −
(
1 − gt
)2 and 1 − g2
t
 , 
according to the quadratic scoring rule, as explained in Sect. 2.11 Expected utility 




In the risk attitude part, the prior probabilities given to the subjects (by way of 
reminder, 0.05, 0.1, 0.15, 0.2, 0.25, 0.75, 0.8, 0.85, 0.9, 0.95 for 10 separate stages/
rounds) are in fact the correct probabilities Pt . We see no reason not to credit sub-
jects with realizing this, and they possess no other information anyway, so we define 
their true guess to be g∗
t
= Pt . Offerman et al. (2009) then interpret the deviations of 





































10 For example, at the start of the experiment, before any ball is drawn, subjects know that the chance 
that Urn 1 was drawn is 0.6. It therefore follows that the chance of a white ball being drawn for the very 
first time is 0.7 × 0.6 + 0.3 × (1 − 0.6) = 0.54.
11 It is straightforward to derive the equivalent of (1) for CARA utility, and later in “Appendix 5: Robust-
ness and understanding” the CARA g∗ ’s are used in a robustness check.
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a regression error.12 Armed with a subject-specific value of  from the risk attitude 
part, all the observable gt values in the main experiment can be transformed to a set 
of inferred g∗
t
 . This transformation is accomplished by exponentiating both sides of 
(1), and solving for g∗
t
 . By taking the inverse cumulative Normal function, Φ−1 , of g∗
t
 
we move it outside the [0, 1] interval and give it the same dimensionality as a z-test 








thus becomes the basis for our econometric analysis.13
We will explain the last column of Table 2 and why it is useful later.
3.2  Expectation processes
Using the notation of Table 2, we define three processes of expectation formation 
that will be relevant for our double hurdle model in Sect. 4.
3.2.1  Rational expectations
The rational expectations solution predicts straightforward Bayesian updating. The 
(conditional) probability the subject is being asked to guess is the rational expecta-
tion (RE), which is given by Pt . Calling Pinitial the initial prior probability and noting 
that the number of white balls is tPw
t
 we can write down Pt in a number of ways:
The second line is a useful simplification (which we use in “Appendix 1: Closeness 
of two strength-of-evidence measures”) whereas the bracketed fraction in the first 
line is the probability of obtaining the tPw
t
 white balls when Urn 1 is drawn versus 
the total probability of obtaining this number of white balls. We called this the like-
lihood ratio in Table 1.
3.2.2  Quasi‑Bayesian updating
In our version of Quasi-Bayesian updating (QB), agents use Bayesian updating as 




































13 The non-parametric analysis of Sect.  4.1 uses unadjusted data, while the econometric analysis of 
Sect. 4.2 uses the risk-adjusted data.
12 See “Appendix  3: Method for estimating CRRA risk parameter” for details. The estimated mean  
across subjects is 0.2. There is considerable heterogeneity across subjects, so in our econometric model-
ling we check for robustness by excluding subjects with extreme values ( |𝜃| > 1.5).
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The parameter  may be thought of as the QB parameter: if  = 1 , agents are 
straightforward Bayesians; if 𝛽 > 1 they overuse information and under-weight pri-
ors; if 0 ≤ 𝛽 < 1 they underuse information and over-weight priors and if 𝛽 < 0 they 
respond the wrong way to information—raising the conditional probability when 
they should be lowering it, and vice versa.
Agents’ attitude towards the extent of belief change in the light of evidence can 
be summarized by the distribution f () across subjects. If f () has most probability 
mass between 0 and 1, most agents only partially adjust, and subjects converge to 
full adjustment at  = 1 to the extent that the probability mass in f () converges 
towards unity.
3.2.3  Inferential expectations
Cohen et al. (2019) show that models with cost-based state-dependent sticky belief 
adjustment are equivalent to an inferential expectations (IE) model, where agents’ 
hypothesis testing generates infrequent belief adjustment (Menzies and Zizzo 
2009).14 We show this in our specific context in “Appendix 2: Relationship between 
inferential expectations and switching cost models”. We therefore are in a position 
to model the degree of state-dependent belief stickiness by the test size, where a low 
test size implies a higher cost of changing beliefs and therefore relatively infrequent 
adjustment.
We assume subjects hold a belief until enough evidence has accumulated to pass 
a threshold of statistical significance, at which point beliefs are updated. Agents 
form a belief and do not depart from that belief until the weight of evidence against 
the belief is sufficiently strong. Under IE, each agent is assumed to start with a belief 
about the probability of U (that is, P0 = 0.6 ) and its implied probability of a white 
ball ( Pw
0
= 0.54 ), and conducts a hypothesis test that the latter is true after drawing a 
test size from his or her own distribution of  , namely fi() . Agents are assumed to 
draw this every round during the experiment.
In the first row of the final column of Table 2, we provide a measure zt of the 
strength of evidence against the probability guess at the time of the last change. 
Agents change their guesses from time to time, and zt tells us if the value of P at the 
last change, denoted Pm , seems mistaken in the light of subsequent evidence.
Importantly, as shown in “Appendix  1: Closeness of two strength-of-evidence 





















14 Cohen et al.’s (2019) explanation relies on a cost of adjustment. This must be interpreted as a cogni-
tive cost, since there is no financial penalty for adjustment in our experiment. A cognitive cost might also 
be described as ‘laziness’. However, we should note that cognitive effort in attention may well take place, 
rather than the cognitive cost being simply about lack of effort as the notion of ‘laziness’ and its associ-
ated implicit moral censure seems to imply. Either way, any explanation of inertia is provisional in our 
context given the difficulty of inferring mental states from inaction.
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proportion, shown in the second row of the final column of Table 2, using the maxi-
mal value of the variance of the sampling distribution (namely ( 1
2
)2):
Thus, the p value for IE can be derived from (4) as the test statistic. We assume for 
simplicity that zt is distributed as a standard Normal.
Later in the paper we derive the full distribution of  so as to let the data adjudi-
cate each agent’s attitude towards evidence. If fi() has most probability mass near 
zero, agent i exhibits sticky belief adjustment. Probability mass in fi() near unity 
implies a willingness to update for any evidence. In the limit, as  approaches unity, 
agents will update regardless of evidence (or, more precisely, even for zero evidence 
against the null). This is equivalent to (stochastic) time dependent updating. That 
is, if the probability mass at unity in fi() is, say, 0.3, it implies that there is a thirty 
per cent chance that agent i will update regardless of what the evidence says. More 
formally, the decision rule in a hypothesis test is to reject H0 , the status quo, if the p 
value ≤  . A value for  of unity implies the status quo will be rejected, which is the 
same as updating in this context, for any p value whatsoever.
3.2.4  Relationship between expectations benchmarks
When agent i rejects H0 within the IE framework we assume she updates her prob-
ability guess using Quasi-Bayesian updating.
Since each agent has a full distribution of  , namely fi() , we need a representa-
tive i to summarize the extent of sticky belief adjustment for agent i and to relate 
to her i . There are a number of possibilities, but a natural choice which permits 
analytic solutions is the median i from their fi() . For the purposes of our empiri-
cal analysis a fully rational (Bayesian) agent is one who has (median) i = i = 1 , 
whereas any other sort of agent does not have RE.
We now parameterize all three expectation processes in a double hurdle model. 
We find evidence for all of them in our data, and importantly we find that the IE 
representation of fi() has non-zero measure at unity. As discussed above, this is the 
fraction of agents who undertake random belief adjustment.
4  Data analysis and model estimation
4.1  Nonparametric analysis
The baseline and complex treatments each had 82 subjects, and the inattention treat-
ment had 81 subjects. In this sub-section, we motivate our model with nonparamet-
ric analysis.
First, we consider the number of times our subjects executed a no-change, mean-
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because, given the nature of the information and comparatively small number of 
draws, incidences of no-change are not predicted by either Bayesian or Quasi-Bayes-
ian updating, and so, if such observations are widespread in the data, this is the first 
piece of nonparametric evidence that these standard models are incomplete.
The maximum of the number of no-changes for each subject is 49: seven opportu-
nities for no change out of eight draws, times the seven stages. The distributions over 
subjects separately by treatment are shown in Fig. 1. The baseline distribution shows 
a concentration at low values; for both Complex and Inattention, there appears to 
be a shift in the distribution towards higher values, as one might expect. The means 
for each treatment are represented by the vertical lines on the right hand side. The 
vertical lines on the left hand side show the mean number of no-changes that would 
result from subjects rounding the Bayesian probabilities to two decimal places (or, 
equivalently, rounding percentages). Clearly, rounding cannot account for the preva-
lence of no-changes found in the empirical distribution.
The mean is higher under C (22.79) than under B (18.74) (Mann–Whitney test 
gives p = 0.007 ); and higher under I (26.97) than under B ( p < 0.001).15 This is 
expected: complexity and inattention are both expected to increase the tendency to 
leave guesses unchanged. When C and I are compared, the p value is 0.06, indicat-
ing mild evidence of a difference between the two treatments.
In Fig. 1 it is clear from the nonparametric evidence of widespread incidence of 
no-changes that any successful model of our data will have to deal with the phenom-
enon of whether to adjust, before considering how much to adjust.
Second, when agents do change, it is of interest why they do. In Fig. 2 we plot 
the binary indicator for updating against the strength of evidence against the main-
tained beliefs ||zit|| (the absolute change in the Bayesian posterior since the last time 
the subject updated; see top of row Table 2). A Lowess smoother is superimposed, 
and this can be interpreted as the predicted probability of an update for a given value 
of ||zit|| . This provides good nonparametric evidence that higher values of ||zit|| make 
change more likely, but, across subjects, agents who are more reluctant to change 
will exhibit both a relatively low probability of update and a higher value of ||zit|| . 
Hence there is an econometric concern that the relationship may be affected by 
endogeneity bias.16
Third, Fig. 3 shows the extent of any updating on receipt of a white ball and an 
orange ball, both as a raw change and as a proportion of the absolute change dictated 
by Bayes rule. The upper panels indicate that updates are often in step sizes of 0.1 or 
0.05 and the 0.6 prior for Pt was not so asymmetric as to generate artefacts.
In the lower panels, the updates relative to the Bayesian benchmark cluster 
between zero and one (for a white ball) and minus one and zero (for an orange 
15 All p values in the paper are two tailed. All bivariate tests use subject level means so that the inde-
pendent observations avoid the problem of dependence of within-subject choices.
16 On another econometric matter, the RHS plots by treatment provide suggestive evidence that treat-
ment dummies shifting the probability of adjustment are warranted in the econometric modelling of 
Sect. 4.2.
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ball).17 This shows that when agents adjust, they tend to do so in a reasonable direc-
tion for risk averse agents, raising their probability for Urn 1 when a white ball is 
drawn and lowering it when an orange ball is drawn.18 Furthermore, the clustering 
indicates that any Quasi-Bayesian representation of their adjustment will require a  
parameter less than unity, reflecting insufficient belief adjustment.
These nonparametric statistics are consistent with more than one theoreti-
cal approach, but it is not clear that just one approach will explain all the features 
of the data. With that in mind, we now turn to a model which allows the different 
approaches to co-exist.
4.2  A double hurdle model of belief adjustment
In this section, we develop a parametric double hurdle model which simultaneously 
considers the decision to update beliefs and the extent to which beliefs are changed 
when updates occur. The purpose of the model is to act as a testing tool for state-
dependent belief adjustment, namely Bayesian belief adjustment and Quasi-Bayes-
ian belief adjustment in the simple version previously defined, as well as (stochastic) 
time-dependent belief adjustment.










 , which in turn requires an estimate for risk aversion. We estimate 
this at the individual level using the technique by Offerman et al. (2009). “Appen-
dix  3: Method for estimating CRRA risk parameter” contains the subject-level 
details surrounding the estimation of i . On average, agents are risk averse with a 
mean  of 0.2.19
We will refer to r∗
it
 , subject i’s belief in period t, as shorthand for ‘transformed 
implied belief’. We will treat r∗
it
 as the focus of the analysis, because r∗
it
 has the 
same dimensionality as z
it
 , the test statistic defined in (4). That is, both have sup-
port (−∞,∞) . Sometimes r∗
it
 changes between t − 1 and t; other times, it remains 
the same. Let Δr∗
it








In the following estimation we exploit the near equivalence between (4) and the 










t (from Table 2). 
In round 1, Pm equals the prior 0.6 and the movement of the guess for a given 
17 Plots by treatment for Fig. 3 are provided in “Appendix 5: Robustness and understanding”.
18 The true guess g∗ should always rise when the draw is white, and vice versa when the draw is 
orange. Online appendix 1 has an extensive discussion of why a minority of contrarian adjustments 
(falls on white and increases on orange) is observed in Fig. 3. In brief, round 1 data suggests an error 
rate of around 5% and this is supported by the results of the double hurdle model presented later. That 
said, it can be optimal for g to move in the opposite direction to g∗ . The variance of the scaled pay-
off linearized around g∗ , 1 − (X − g)2 ≈ 1 − (g∗ − g)2 − 2(g∗ − g)(X − g∗) , is 4(g∗ − g)2V(X) , where 
X ∼ Bernoulli(g∗) . Thus, risk averse agents will always want to move their g in line with g∗ to minimize 
variance, but agents who love risk enough might possibly move g in the opposite direction to g∗.
19 This is in the neighborhood of the 0.3–0.5 range elicited by Holt and Laury (2002, p. 1649) using 
their Multiple Price List (MPL) task. In the results to follow, the heterogeneity of  , along with a roughly 
even split between risk loving and risk averse agents, corroborates the usefulness of the robustness analy-
sis in “Appendix 5: Robustness and understanding”.






− Φ−1(0.6) . That is, both the objective measure of the informa-
tion change and the subjective guess of the agent are assumed to anchor onto the 
prior probability that Urn 1 is chosen, 0.6, in the first period.
4.2.1  First hurdle
The probability that a belief is updated (in either direction) in period t is given by:
where Φ[⋅] is the standard Normal cdf and i represents subject i’s idiosyncratic pro-
pensity to update beliefs, and therefore models random probabilistic belief adjust-
ment (time-dependent belief adjustment). The probability of an update is assumed 
to depend (positively) on the absolute value of zit , the test statistic. The vector xi 
contains treatment and gender dummy variables together with an age variable and a 





≠ 0) = Φ[i + x�iΨ1 + ||zit||
]
,
Fig. 1  Distributions of number of no-changes over subjects separately by treatment. In each panel, the 
vertical line on the right represents the mean number of no-changes per subject, while the vertical line on 
the left would be the outcome of Bayesian behaviour if subjects rounded their answers
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main part of the experiment was explained,20 all of which are time invariant and can 
be expected to affect the propensity to update.
One econometric issue flagged in the last sub-section is the endogeneity of the 
variable ||zit|| : subjects who are averse to updating tend to generate large values of ||zit|| 
while subjects who update regularly do not allow it to grow beyond small values. 
This could create a downward bias in the estimate of the parameter  in the first hur-
dle. To deal with this concern we use an instrumental variables (IV) estimator which 
uses the variable |̂|zit|| in place of ||zit|| , where |̂|zit|| comprises the fitted values from a 
regression of ||zit|| on a set of suitable instruments.
21
4.2.2  Second hurdle
Conditional on subject i choosing to update beliefs in draw t, the next question 
relates to how much they do so. This is given by:
Fig. 2  Predicted probability of updating against strength of evidence (the latter measured as the absolute 
value of z, defined in Table 2). The dots represent individual decisions to update (1 = update; 0 = no 
update). The lines are Lowess smoothers, obtained using a tricube weighting function and bandwidth 0.8 
(both STATA defaults). Left panel: smoother obtained for full sample. Right panel: smoother obtained 
separately by treatment
20 These are questions 1 and 2 in the main part questionnaire as provided in online appendix 4. A third 
question was used on subjects for all treatments but a software coding error prohibited its use for analy-
sis.
21 See “Appendix 4: IV Estimator”.
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As a reminder, the Quasi-Bayesian belief adjustment parameter i represents subject 
i’s idiosyncratic responsiveness to the accumulation of new information: if i = 1 , 
subject i responds fully; if i = 0 , subject i does not respond at all. Remember that i 
is not constrained to [0, 1]. In particular, a value of i greater than one would indicate 
the plausible phenomenon of overreaction. Again, treatment variables are included: 
the elements of the vector Ψ2 tell us how responsiveness differs by treatment.
Considering the complete model, there are two idiosyncratic parameters, i and 
i . These are assumed to be distributed over the population of subjects as follows:
In total, there are seventeen parameters to estimate: 1 , 1 , 2 , 2 ,  ,  ,  , four treat-
ment effects (two in each hurdle); two gender effects (one in each hurdle); two scores 






































Fig. 3  Change in guess: raw, and as a proportion of a Bayesian benchmark. The top panels show the 
raw size of the updates on receiving a ball of each color. The bottom panels show the proportional size 
of the updates on receiving a ball of each color: this is defined as the actual update on receiving a ball 
as a proportion of the absolute correct Bayesian update (assuming the subject starts from the Bayesian 
prediction). A vertical line is drawn in correspondence to 0 (no update) and, for the bottom panels, in 
correspondence to the Bayesian proportional change in guess (so 1 on receiving a white ball and − 1 on 
receiving an orange ball). Data from all treatments are used
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in each hurdle). Estimation is performed using the method of maximum simulated 
likelihood (MSL), with a set of Halton draws representing each of the two idiosyn-
cratic parameters appearing in (7). Following estimation of the model, Bayes rule is 
used to obtain posterior estimates (denoted 𝛿i and 𝛽i ) of the idiosyncratic parameters 
for each subject.22
The results are presented in Table 3 for four different models. The last column 
shows the preferred model. Model 1 estimates the QB benchmark, in which it is 
assumed that the first hurdle is crossed for every observation—that is, updates 
always occur. Zero updates are treated as zero realizations of the update variable in 
the second hurdle, and their likelihood contribution is a density instead of a prob-
ability. Because of this difference in the way the likelihood function is computed, 
the log-likelihoods and AICs cannot be used to compare the performance of QB to 
that of the other models.
Model 2 estimates the IE benchmark, in which the update parameter ( i ) is fixed 
at 1 for all subjects. Consequently the extra residual variation in updates is reflected 
in the higher estimate of  . The parameters in the first hurdle are free.
Model 3 combines IE and QB, but constrains the correlation (  ) between  and  
to be zero. Model 4 is the same model with  unconstrained.
The overall performance of a model is judged initially using the AIC; the pre-
ferred model being the one with the lowest AIC. Using this criterion, the best model 
is the most general model 4 (model 1 not being subject to the AIC criterion): IE-QB 
with  unrestricted, whose results are presented in the final column of Table 3.
To confirm the superiority of the general model over the restricted models, we 
conduct Wald tests of the restrictions implied by the three less general models. We 
see that, in all three cases, the implied restrictions are rejected, implying that the 
general model is superior. Note in particular that this establishes the superiority of 
the general model 4 (IE-QB with  unrestricted) over the QB model 1 (a comparison 
that was not possible on the basis of AIC).
Further confirmation is furnished by measuring the sample predictive accuracy 
on a subsample of data (the ‘cross validation’ approach). ROC (Receiver Operating 
Characteristic) is the model’s out of sample predictive accuracy for hurdle 1 (the 
frequency of updates) and R2 (out of sample) is the model’s predictive accuracy for 
hurdle 2 (the extent of updates).23 Model 4 is no worse than model 3 on an ROC 
22 For detailed examples of the use of MSL applied to similar models, including the process of extract-
ing the posterior estimates, see Moffatt (2015). For a more general discussion of this estimation 
approach, see Train (2009).
23 ROC is a methodology that is applied in binary data settings (e.g. our first hurdle). Clearly, when the 
outcome is binary, the prediction is in the form of a “predicted probability of a 1”, so there is no such 
thing as a “correct prediction”. A starting point is to define a prediction to be correct if the predicted 
probability of the observed outcome is greater than 0.5. However, the threshold need not be 0.5. ROC 
forms a test statistic by finding the number of correct predictions at all possible thresholds. The out-
come in the second hurdle is continuous, so standard measures of predictive performance (e.g. predictive 
R-squared) are applicable. Both measures of predictive performance are out-of-sample measures. For the 
purpose of obtaining them, a 50% sample was used for estimation, and the remaining 50% of the obser-
vations were predicted. The number we report for ROC is the area under the ROC curve. This curve 
compares the true positive rate of prediction with the false positive rate of prediction for the universe of 
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criterion, but predicts the extent of adjustment better. Model 1 is best of all at pre-
dicting the extent of adjustment, but it fails to predict ‘no-change behavior’, by con-
struction. Thus, on both in and out of sample criteria, model 4 is best overall.24
We interpret the results from model 4 as follows. Consider the first hurdle (propen-
sity to update). The intercept parameter in the first hurdle ( 1 ) tells us that a typical 
subject has a predicted probability of Φ(0.061) = 0.524 of updating in any task, in 
the absence of any evidence (i.e. when ||zit|| = 0 ). We note that this estimate is not sig-
nificantly different from zero, which would imply a 50% probability of updating. The 
Inattention treatment effect is significant and negative, suggesting that the probability 
of update is lower when subjects are not paying attention. So is the Complexity treat-
ment but not by as much. The effect of the questionnaire score is negative and signifi-
cant, though it is not large. The negative coefficient is consistent with Cohen et al.’s 
(2019) model if subjects have cognitive costs. This gives us our first result:
Result 1 There is evidence of time-dependent (random) belief adjustment. Subjects 
update their beliefs idiosyncratically around half the time.
The large estimate of 1 tells us that there is considerable heterogeneity in the 
propensity to update (see Fig. 4), something we will explore further in Sect. 4.3. The 
parameter  is estimated to be significantly positive, and this tells us, as expected, 
that the more cumulative evidence there is, in either direction, the greater the prob-
ability of an update:
Result 2 There is evidence of state-dependent belief adjustment. Subjects are more 
likely to adjust if there is more evidence to suggest that an update is appropriate 
(thus making it costlier not to update).
In the second hurdle, the intercept ( 2 ) is estimated to be 0.819 in our preferred 
model 4: when a typical (baseline) subject does update, she updates by a proportion 
0.819 of the difference from the Bayes probability. The large estimate of 2 tells us that 
there is considerable heterogeneity in this proportion also (see Fig. 4). Interestingly, on 
the basis of the posterior estimates from model 4, only 13 out of 245 subjects appear 
to have 𝛽 < 0 , which indicates noise or confused subjects who adjusted in the wrong 
Footnote 23 (continued)
possible thresholds. The R2 (out of sample) is computed by comparing predictions from the second hur-
dle with actual decisions contingent on an update occurring.
24 In “Appendix 5: Robustness and understanding” we provide a number of robustness checks on model 
4, and check for comprehension by the subjects more generally. We supplement this section by (1) run-
ning model 4 using CARA preferences to correct for risk aversion; (2) estimating model 4 on a subset of 
(near) risk neutral subjects; (3) separately running model 4 using the subset of data where subjects cor-
rectly answered both comprehension questions; (4) exploring the Inattention and Complexity treatments 
on their own to check for coherence between the comprehension questionnaires and the model results; 
(5) providing the marks for the comprehension questionnaire; and (6) providing data on the risk attitude 
part which helps explain the distribution of .
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direction. Moreover, 87 out of 245 subjects (around one third) display overreaction to 
the evidence. We summarize this in the following result:
Result 3 There is evidence of Quasi-Bayesian partial belief adjustment. On aver-
age, subjects who adjust do so by around 80%. There is evidence of prior informa-
tion under-weighting: around one third of the subjects overreact to evidence once 
they decide to adjust.
Table 3  Results of hurdle model with risk adjustment
LogL for QB cannot be compared with that of other columns
QB IE IE-QB (  = 0) IE-QB
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Propensity to update




[1] [0.57] [0.56] [0.52]
 1 0 1.243** (0.063) 1.315** (0.059) 1.28** (0.057)
  0 0.603** (0.102) 0.598** (0.102) 0.597** (0.102)
 Complex 0 − 0.199 (0.181) − 0.273** (0.081) − 0.211** (0.075)
 Inattention 0 − 0.276 (0.174) − 0.398** (0.077) − 0.305** (0.076)
 Male 0 − 0.324** (0.137) − 0.419** (0.088) − 0.382** (0.079)
 Comprehension 0 − 0.126 (0.107) − 0.147** (0.064) − 0.133** (0.056)
 Age-22 0 − 0.037** (0.009) − 0.026** (0.004) − 0.025** (0.005)
Extent of update
 2 0.522** (0.085) 1 0.609** (0.099) 0.819** (0.123)
 2 0.498** (0.022) 0 0.807** (0.033) 0.876** (0.044)
 Complex − 0.022 (0.078) 0 0.049 (0.085) 0.116 (0.093)
 Inattention − 0.074 (0.075) 0 0.240** (0.076) − 0.254** (0.092)
 Comprehension − 0.007 (0.046) 0 0.014 (0.054) − 0.023 (0.062)
 Male − 0.027 (0.068) 0 0.271** (0.072) 0.203** (0.078)
 Age-22 0.021** (0.005) 0 0.019** (0.005) 0.019** (0.007)
 0.516** (0.003) 0.731** (0.006) 0.660** (0.006) 0.660** (0.006)
 N/A N/A 0 − 0.18* (0.081)
LogL − 8,790 − 12,328 − 11,924 − 11,923
AIC (= 2k − 2LogL) N/A 24,690 23,882 23,880
Wald test (df, p value) 66,599 (9, 0.000) 430 (8, 0.000) 4.36 (1, 0.037) N/A
ROC (out of sample) Fail by definition 0.551 0.588 0.588
R2 (out of sample) 0.090 0.082 0.081 0.083
n (subjects) 245 245 245 245
T (observations per 
subject)
56 56 56 56
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The estimate of  is negative, indicating that subjects who have a higher propensity 
to update, tend to update by a lower proportion of the difference from the Bayes prob-
ability. Inattention is important for both hurdles:
Result 4 Inattention lowers the probability of updating from 50 to 40% and lowers 
the extent of update from 80 to 56% of the amount prescribed by Bayes rule. Com-
plexity also lowers the probability of update in the first hurdle.
4.3  The empirical distribution of ̨  and ˇ
To get a better sense of the population heterogeneity in belief adjustment, this sub-
section maps out the empirical distribution of the IE i and QB i parameters across 
subjects against each other. The estimated distribution f () can be seen from the 
distribution of the posterior estimates 𝛽i from Model 4, and this distribution is the 
marginal distribution of the extent of update on the vertical axis on the bottom-right 
panel of Fig. 4. We next use the first hurdle information to generate fi() , the empir-
ical distribution of i.
Fig. 4  Jittered scatter of posterior QB parameter against posterior probability of updating for the four 
models whose estimates are reported in Table 3. Scatters based on Models 1 (top left), 2 (top right), 3 
(bottom left) and 4 (bottom right) in Table 3 respectively. Each dot corresponds to a subject
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As we flagged earlier, each agent has a full distribution of  and so we need a rep-
resentative i to summarize the extent of sticky belief adjustment for agent i, to then 
relate to their i . As will be clear below, the choice that permits analytic solutions is 
the median i from fi().
The econometric equation for the first hurdle is equivalent to the probability of 
rejecting the null under IE. We omit the dummy variables and begin by re-writing 
the first hurdle, namely (5):
where i and  are estimated parameters and ||zit|| is the test statistic based on the pro-
portion of white balls:
For any ||zit|| it is possible to work out an implied p value and we do so by assuming 
that (9) is approximately distributed N(0, 1). This in turn allows us to work out fi() 
from the econometric equation for the first hurdle. When ||zit|| = 0 , the p value for a 
hypothesis test is unity, and so the equation says that a fraction of agents will reject 
H0 if the p value is unity. Since the criterion for rejecting H0 in a hypothesis test is 
always  ≥ p-value, the observed behavior of rejecting H0 when ||zit|| = 0 implies that 
there must be a non-zero probability mass on fi() at the value of  exactly equal 
to 1. The pdf of i will thus have a discrete ‘spike’ at unity and be continuous else-






The probability of rejecting H0 depends on the probability that the test size is 
greater than the p value, but this is also equal to the econometric equation for the 
first hurdle.
Upper case F in the last equality is the anti-derivative of the density. We define Fi(1) 
to be unity since 1 is the upper end of the support of  but we also note that there 




 to 1 at  = 1 , as a consequence 
of the non-zero probability mass on fi() at unity. To solve the equation we use an 
expression for the p value of ||zit|| on a two-sided Normal test.
We use a ‘single parameter’ approximation to the cumulative Normal (see Bowling 
et al. 2009). For our purposes 
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We can now write down ||zit|| as a function of the p value using (11) and (12):
Intuitively, a p value of zero implies an infinite ||zit|| and a p value of unity implies 





 and our estimated first hurdle to generate Fi().
In the above expression the variable ‘ p-valueit ’ is just a place-holder and can be 
replaced by anything with the same support leaving the meaning of (14) unchanged. 
Thus, it can be replaced by  giving the cumulative density of .
Substitution of  = 1 does not give unity, which is what we earlier assumed for the 




 , which of course concurs with the 
econometric equation for the first hurdle when ||zit|| = 0 . This discontinuity in Fi 
is consistent with a discrete probability mass in fi() at unity, as we noted earlier. 
It now just remains to differentiate Fi to obtain the continuous density fi() for  
strictly less than unity. The description of the function at the upper end of the sup-





Figure 5 illustrates the distribution fi() for i = 0.1 and  = 0.6 together with the 
distributions one standard deviation either side of i . The former is the mean of  
across subjects, from our estimation (from the last column of Table 3, rounded). On 
the right-most of the chart is the probability mass when  = 1 . As discussed ear-
lier, this corresponds to the proportion of agents who update on vanishingly small 
evidence ( ||zit|| = 0 ). There is clearly a great deal of interesting heterogeneity. One 
distribution has a near-zero probability of a random update (10%) and when the 
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call them ‘classical statisticians’ given the large probability mass around 1%, 5% 
and 10%. Another distribution has a virtually certain probability of a random update 
(90%) and we might call these agents ‘fully attentive’. The central estimate of  
describes an agent who updates roughly half the time, and otherwise has a more or 
less uniform distribution over .
Since there are idiosyncratic values of i there will be a separate distribution for 
every subject varying over i . So we must use a summary statistic for fi() , and the 
one which comes to hand is the median  value, obtained by solving Fi() = 0.5 
in Eq. (15). In Fig. 6, we plot the collection of subject i’s (median  ,  ) duples for 
model 4, our preferred equation. Table  4 lists the percentage of subjects in each 
(median i , i ) 0.2 bracket.25
Roughly half the subjects update regardless of evidence, so the median  ’s cluster 
at unity along the bottom axis with half of them (49%) in the range at or above 0.8. 
Just under one quarter (22%) of agents could be described as classical statisticians 
with median  ’s around the 1–10% level and a similar figure (28%) have ‘conserva-
tive belief adjustment’, with -values no more than 0.20.
Regarding the size of updating, we already know from Result 3 that it is less than 
complete. In Table 4, 22% update no more than 40 per cent of what they should.
Result 5 Estimated test sizes spread over the whole support [0, 1] but are clustered 
at zero and unity. The extent-of-update distribution has a large probability mass 
around 50% but an even larger mass for values over unity.
In supplementary analysis (see online appendix 5), we find that infrequent 
updaters ( med : 0–0.2) have larger mean square deviations (MSD) from Bayesian’s 
guesses than other subjects. Frequent updaters ( med : 0.8–1) tend to have larger 
MSD as each stage progresses, which can be explained by comparative underadjust-
ment or overadjustment of beliefs in the second hurdle of our model (see Table 4).26
5  Discussion and conclusion
The double hurdle model we have developed in this paper allows us to integrate both 
time- and state-dependent belief adjustment in a unified econometric framework. 
Our experiment uses a quadratic scoring rule with monetary payoffs to incentivize 
subjects, and we operationalize Offerman et al. (2009) in order to attempt to control 
for risk aversion. Further research could use different belief elicitation methods to 
verify the robustness of our findings.
Our econometric model found evidence for considerable heterogeneity in both the 
propensity and extent of updating, with the majority of agents departing from the 
25 Rounding implies occasional discrepancies in the row and column totals shown.
26 Within each stage, MSD increases as the stage progresses since the behavioral impact of the devia-
tions from Bayesian behaviour becomes progressively more significant. We find instead no evidence that 
MSD changes across stages, i.e. with general experience.
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rational expectations benchmark of  =  = 1 . Yet deviations from this benchmark 
are systematic, predictable and can be understood within our modelling framework. 
We observe random belief adjustment around half the time, which is consistent with 
stochastic time-dependent belief adjustment. Deviations from Bayesian updating 
are systematically in the direction of under-adjustment, with a mean of 80% of full 
adjustment. The likelihood of a belief change increases as the amount of evidence 
against the no-change status quo increases, which is consistent with state-dependent 
belief adjustment.
Our aggregate findings are broadly in favor of under- as opposed to over-adjust-
ment to information, which is consistent with prior belief conservatism findings 
(such as Phillips and Edwards 1966) and the overall finding of under-inference 
in Benjamin’s (2019) review. It is however in apparent contrast with the base rate 
neglect from static experimental settings such as Kahneman and Tversky (1973) and 
Tversky and Kahneman (1982). That said, we note based on Table 4 that, when sub-
jects are at the second hurdle, while 52% of subjects have a i less than 1, 36% of 
them do have a i above 1, i.e. around a third over-weight rather than under-weight 
new information. One possible explanation for the greater proportion of under-
weighting relative to some other research is that, where the prior is not actually per-
ceived as a genuine and meaningful anchor by subjects—or at least it is perceived 
as a less reliable source of information than the new information [as in Goodie and 
Fantino (1999), or some of the settings by Massey and George (2005)]—, then it is 
more likely to be under-weighted. This is likely to be more the case in static experi-
mental settings, or (following a conjecture by Benjamin (2019)) where priors are 
based on extreme probabilities.27 Clearly, more research is needed.
Another interesting finding from our double hurdle model is that around half our 
subjects have i less than 0.8. Unlike our dynamic setup, the nature of tasks in static 
experimental settings as well as others where regime change is to be detected [as in 
Fig. 5  Distribution of fi() for i = 0.1 and  = 0.6 together with the distributions one standard deviation 
either side of i
27 See Benjamin (2019) for a recent discussion of some of the other factors that may be at work.
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Massey and George (2005)], arguably nudges people to make an active choice and to 
pay the required cognitive and inattention costs.
We believe that a setting where there is no such nudge is a more accurate reflec-
tion of many real world decision settings, such as investment portfolio choice over 
time (Cohen et  al. 2019). Cost-based state-dependent sticky belief adjustment can 
be micro-founded on adjustment costs, for example inattention costs (Alvarez et al. 
2016), information costs (Abel et al. 2013), or cognitive costs (Magnani et al. 2016); 
these, in turn, can be modelled in a stylized way using a hypothesis testing frame-
work, as shown by Cohen et al. (2019) and explained in “Appendix 2: Relationship 
between inferential expectations and switching cost models”. We avoid incentivizing 
the distractor task to help with the interpretability of the findings in a first experi-
ment studying the effect of inattention on belief updating; changing this could be an 
interesting direction of future research.
We have parameterized the degree of state-dependent belief stickiness by the 
distribution of the test size. This is informative in two respects. First, the proba-
bility mass at  = 1 measures the extent of time-dependent adjustment. Second, 
Fig. 6  Median  against median  for Model 4. Each point represents a subject
Table 4  Percentage of subjects in each ( i, i ) bracket in model 4

med below 0 
(%)






0.8–1 (%) Above 1 
(%)
Total (%)
0–0.2 2 0 4 3 3 4 12 28
0.2–0.4 0 1 1 1 1 1 3 8
0.4–0.6 0 2 0 2 1 1 2 7
0.6–0.8 0 0 1 0 1 1 3 7
0.8–1 2 3 5 11 7 5 16 49
Total 5 6 11 17 13 12 36 100
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where agents instead adopt state-dependent adjustment, the density over the support 
 = [0, 1) , as shown in Fig. 5, informs us about the extent of belief conservatism. On 
this note, we estimate that roughly one quarter of agents are highly belief conserva-
tive with  ≤ 0.2.
Although the negative correlation between  and  in Fig.  6 is not significant, 
the relevant pair of parameters in the double hurdle model do have a significantly 
negative correlation. Thus we have established that agents who tend to update with 
a low frequency may update a little more when they do update. Subjects with a good 
understanding of the experiment may defer adjustment because of cognitive and 
inattention costs, but may be more rather than less Bayesian when an adjustment 
does take place.
We vary task complexity and likelihood of inattention in belief updating, as these 
are important dimensions that, we claim, affect how effectively agents process infor-
mation in the real world. We conceive of inattention costs as the costs of departing 
from a default choice. This is a natural way of modelling many real world settings 
in which choices remain as default (e.g. portfolio choices) unless actively changed, 
and in this respect we follow Khaw et al. (2017) although they do not manipulate 
the likelihood of inattention (or task complexity). We do not find that task confusion 
explains belief stickiness to an important degree, nor is there any financial incentive 
to explain why beliefs are stickier if we add an alternative distracting task. Rather, 
inattention and cognitive costs are likely to explain infrequent adjustment, to differ-
ent degrees, by half our subjects.
“Appendix  5: Robustness and understanding” provides descriptive statistics on 
the optional task, and specifically on how many counting tasks were answered by 
each subject correctly or incorrectly. It also contains a regression for the inatten-
tion treatment where ‘Correct counting tasks’ and ‘incorrect counting tasks’ (refer-
ring to the number of each per subject) both have a significant and negative effect 
on the probability of updating. This supports the conclusion that the effect of the 
optional task was to distract subjects, who therefore paid less attention than they 
should have. As noted at the end of Sect. 2, since the optional task was unincentiv-
ized, we have cleanly identified this as inattention as opposed to (for example) being 
bad at multitasking.
Table  8 in “Appendix  5: Robustness and understanding” includes a regression 
model with maths ability as an explanatory variable, which we measure in the C 
treatment. This variable is insignificant even in the treatment where potentially it 
should have mattered the most, which undermines its relevance. The answer of how 
increased complexity affects updating is instead provided by the preferred gen-
eral models (3) and (4) in Table 3, as well as the model in Table 8 in “Appendix 5: 
Robustness and understanding” restricting the sample to subjects who answered cor-
rectly the understanding questions. Specifically, complexity makes subjects keener 
to stick to the default rather than making an active choice (see Gerasimou 2018). 
This leads to guesses that are on average more distant from the Bayesian predictions 
(see online appendix 5).
We conclude by populating the cells from Table 1, which provided a taxonomy 
for agents’ updating, with our empirical results, to give Table 5. Such an exercise 
is tentative, since ours is the first study to combine the frequency and extent of 
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adjustment in a unified econometric framework. We have also had to make minor 
adjustments to the table: with respect to the frequency of adjustment, agents are 
inattentive if the median  is less than the smallest classical test size (0.01) and, with 
respect to the extent of adjustment,  is continuous in our model so we must deem it 
to be unity when it is within a small range (0.2) of that value.
Based on the prevalence of agents, the Quasi-Bayesian modelling strategy of 
assuming period-by-period updating of information, but with less than full adjust-
ment, commends itself by the behaviour of 28% of agents. The next most common 
behaviour is Quasi-Bayesian adjustment combined with Inferential Expectations 
(22%). An advantage of the latter, not shown in the table but shown in Fig. 5, is that 
an empirical distribution of inferential expectations  ’s allows for both time- and 
state-dependent adjustment, where the probability mass on unity implies stochas-
tic time-dependent adjustment. Among the least common behaviours is full rational 
expectations (3%), defined as the fully attentive use of Bayes rule (  =  = 1).
It is not clear yet how generalizable these proportions are and future research 
might profitably probe them with our double hurdle model in different experimental 
environments. However, the non-dominance of any row or column within our tax-
onomy is evidence that both the extent and frequency of adjustment should be taken 
into account in economic modelling.
Appendix 1: Closeness of two strength‑of‑evidence measures
Our measure of evidence that the guess should change between times t and m is:
where the cumulative Normal Φ , and its inverse, are approximated.





























































αmed ≈ 0(< 0.01) (Inattentive) 0% 4% 3% 7%
0.01 < αmed < 1 (Partly attentive) 3% 22% 4% 12%
αmed = 1 (Fully attentive) 2% 28% 3% 11%
∗ The value of one is taken to be 0.9 ≤ β ≤ 1.1.
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If t ≈ m , we have
Appendix 2: Relationship between inferential expectations 
and switching cost models
Cohen et al. (2019) prove that, for a sequential inference problem, such as our updat-
ing of the sample proportion of white draws Pw
t
 , the presence of a cost for switch-
ing the inferred value results in a classic confidence-interval band of inaction. This 
enables us to model sticky adjustment due to switching costs as a two-sided hypoth-
esis test, since it is reasonable to posit a cognitive cost for our subjects changing 
their declared probability of Urn 1 (which is the same as changing their estimate of 
Pw
t
 ). While the fully-fledged proof uses a large sample size and a Bayesian filtering 
framework, this sub-section illustrates the intuition of their argument in an environ-
ment like our experiment. We prove that the proportion of white balls is approxi-
mately a random walk, and then provide the key insight of Cohen et al. (2019) that a 
symmetric band of inaction corresponds to a confidence interval.
Our Pw
t
 is the average of individual Bernoulli draws xt (with probability of white 
p) and we now show how the average is approximated by a random walk. We create 
a synthetic variable st with the same moments as a standard Normal random variable 





is approximately a scaled version of st . First, it is exactly true that:
For this to be a random walk we need to remove Pw
t−1
 from the last term in (17). We 
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describing the approximate evolution of Pw
t
 we do not need to concern ourselves 
with the fact that agents do not know p.
Second, we now demonstrate that the final stochastic term in (18) has a similar mean 
and variance to the correct last term in (17).
The means are the same:
And for large t:
Our random walk approximation is then:
If agents face a fixed adjustment cost to change their estimate of this proportion and 
(as in this experiment) a cost of getting their estimate of p wrong, we may posit a 
band of inaction around the current value of Pw
t
.
Crucially, for a random walk the timeless (unconditional) distribution for a given 
band will be symmetric just like a confidence interval.
Theorem 1 of Cohen et al. (2019) proves that there is an optimal band width which 
balances the fixed cost of adjustment against the cost of the expected distance from the 
true value of p. Wide bands will incur few adjustment costs because the boundaries 
are rarely hit, but they lead to a large expected distance from p. Tight bands mean the 
adjustment cost is paid repeatedly as the boundaries are hit, but the expected distance 
from p becomes very small. Cohen et al. derive the optimal band width which mini-
mizes the sum of these costs, and in their Theorem 2 establish the equivalence between 
this band and a confidence interval. This band of inaction increases with belief con-
servatism which, in the inferential expectations framework used here, corresponds to a 
smaller test size .
Appendix 3: Method for estimating CRRA risk parameter
The log relationship between transformations of gt and g∗t  in the text (Eq. 1) has an i.i.d. 
error added to it and is run with 10 observations as an OLS regression. Figure 7 shows 
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risk attitude part, not to the rounds in the main part. The estimated parameter i is sub-
scripted for subjects, because (20) is run for each subject to provide her own .
We note the following: 
1. The regression has no intercept. If an intercept is included the i estimates are 
inefficient.
2. For some subjects gt = 0.5 in every period. In this case, the RHS variable is ln (1) 
in every period. This means that  approaches +∞ . These estimates need to be 
re-coded to a high positive number, and we use +10.
3. If an agent declared gt = 0 or 1, (20) cannot be run, so these were replaced with 
0.01 and 0.99 respectively.
The above procedure gives rise to a distribution of  over the 245 subjects, which is 
shown in Fig. 8.
The empirical distribution is right-skewed because of subject play outlined in step 
2 above. The choices in step 2 speak of high risk aversion, giving us probability mass 
on high values of  . Choices of g near zero or unity imply  approaches -1. In “Appen-
dix 5: Robustness and understanding” we exclude both extreme risk averse and risk 

























+ t, t = 1, 2,… , 10.
Fig. 7  Jittered scatterplot of guessed probability against true probability. Lowess smoother shown [not 
Eq. (20)]
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Appendix 4: IV Estimator
As mentioned in Sect. 4.2, there is potentially an endogeneity problem with using 
the strength of evidence against the previously chosen value as an explanatory vari-
able in the first hurdle, and in this appendix we guard against this. The problem is 
that the variable is endogenous, because subjects with a low propensity to update 
are clearly likely to generate large values of ||zit|| simply by virtue of rarely updating. 
Hence ||zit|| pooled across subjects may appear to have a negative effect on the pro-
pensity to update.
We proceed using an IV estimator. We first create a prediction of the absolute 
value of zit , |̂|zit|| , for use in the second stage of a two-stage least squares estimation. 
The two instruments for ||zit|| that we use to create this predictor are the round number 
(t), and the absolute value of the contribution to ||zit|| in the current round ||Δzit|| . This 
is not to be confused with the difference built into zit which spans the current period 












 is fixed, 




 over the 
last period.
The stage 1 OLS regression therefore is:
It is important that the dependent variable in (21) is ||zit|| and not zit . If zit were used 
as the dependent variable, and consequently the absolute value of the prediction, ẑit , 
were used in the second stage, we would have what Wooldridge (2010, pp. 267–268) 
refers to as a “forbidden regression”. Using ||zit|| as the dependent variable in (21) 
avoids this problem.
(21)||zit|| = 0 + 1t + 3||Δzit|| + it.
Fig. 8  Distribution of  among 
subjects
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Appendix 5: Robustness and understanding
In this appendix we further explore the level of subjects’ understanding and the 
robustness of the regression results. In the main text we established that, on average, 
subjects raised their guess on receipt of a white ball and dropped it on receipt of an 
orange ball, and that subjects were more likely to update when the evidence sug-
gested they should. Both features of the data, confirmed in the preferred model, are 
evidence that subjects understood their environment.
Behavior also seemed sensible in the risk attitude part. In Table 6, we note the 
frequencies of the chosen probability g at the key choices: zero, 0.5, unity and the 
probability given to them ( g∗ ), as well as the ranges in between. We separate the 
cases where the given probability ( g∗ ) was higher, and lower, than 0.5.
Any extreme choices (e.g. 0% or 100%) can be attributed to risk loving prefer-
ences, but it is noteworthy that in both columns many subjects placed their declared 
probability somewhere between the true probabilities g∗ and 0.5, making them 
observationally, and reasonably, risk neutral or risk averse.28
The subject pool was split evenly by gender (49% male), and had an average age 
of 22 (ranging from 18 to 50). As outlined in the text, a questionnaire was admin-
istered after the experimental instructions were explained. Incorrect answers were 
corrected and explained. There were two questions asked across all treatments. 
Encouragingly, the distribution of correct answers had a mode of 2 out of 2. Table 7 
tallies the number of correct and incorrect answers to each of the two questions. 
Furthermore, for the Complexity treatment only, we had an extra set of 11 ques-
tions related to mathematical abilities.29 Every question was answered correctly by 
approximately 70% of the subjects (between 67.76 and 72.65%). The density of the 
number of questions answered correctly is shown in Fig. 9 and the mode for correct 
answers was 11.
Regression results for our alternative models are given in Table  8. We found 
reasonable results when we ran model 4 using CARA, and over different samples. 
The coefficients on |z| in the first hurdle and the Quasi-Bayesian parameter are 
both positive and significant. The CARA utility model gives similar results to the 
main text, though CRRA is preferable on a predictive ability criterion. For CRRA 
(Table 3) ROC = 0.5880 and R2 = 0.083 while for CARA (Table 8), ROC = 0.5041 
and R2 = 0.058 . We then censored subjects who exhibited extreme risk behaviors 
out of the sample (leaving 204/245 subjects with − 1.5 < 𝜃 < 1.5 ) and separately 
ran the model using the subset of data where subjects correctly answered both 
28 A value close to 50%, or 50% with rounding, is compatible with strong risk aversion. This is not an 
unreasonable interpretation, noting for example that in finance data it is often the case that better cali-
bration results are achieved assuming very high CRRA parameters, such as 30 (see Cecchetti and Mark 
1990; Boguth and Kuehn 2013). Rounding is common in experiments and does not of course imply that 
one cannot use models to predict behavior while accepting the additional noise it entails. For example, it 
is standard to predict ultimatum game results using social preference models which often predict offering 
a little less than half of the pie, even though a typical modal offer is 50% of the pie.
29 Technically, there were three questions, but two of these had five subparts, making a total of 11 ques-
tions.
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Table 6  Choices in risk attitude part
Low True Probability
g∗ = 5, 10, 15, 20, 25%
High True Probability
g∗ = 75, 80, 85, 90, 95%
(risk neutral or risk averse in italics)
g Choices % making choice g Choices % making choice
0% 5 100% 16
in between 11 in between 14
g∗ 8 g∗ 15
in between 35 in between 29
50% 24 50% 18
in between 14 in between 8
100% 3 0% 0




Incorrect 20 (8%) 49 (20%) 69 (28%)
Correct 34 (14%) 142 (58%) 176 (72%)
Total 54 (22%) 191 (78%) 245 (100%)
Fig. 9  Maths comprehension (complexity treatment): Proportions of subjects who answered x number of 
questions correctly
 T. Henckel et al.
1 3
comprehension questions. Finally, the model was run using just the data from the 
Complexity and Inattention treatments.30
The estimated models are broadly similar to the preferred model. Random updat-
ing is more common in CARA, but it is in the neighborhood of 50% for most mod-
els. Importantly, the coefficient on |z| is positive and significant in all models.
In Fig. 10 below, we provide a version of Fig. 2 in a bin scatter format, which is 
able to represent the ‘average’ of the choices in each of a predetermined number of 
bins. (We chose 10.) The pattern seen here is the same as in Fig. 2, and similarly 
suggests the desirability of protecting the estimates from any endogeneity bias. Oth-
erwise, it is given for completeness.
In Fig.  11 below, we show the extent of updating depicted in the main text in 
Fig. 3, by treatment. They are not particularly informative, except to confirm that the 
direction of change observed in the pooled data is true of individual treatments as 
well.
Finally, we have also checked how subjects played the counting task in the inat-
tention treatment. Fully 63 out of 81 subjects (77.8%) did at least one counting task. 
These 63 subjects solved counting tasks on average 12.2% of the times. When they 
solved them, they did so correctly around nine out of ten times (88.6%).
30 The extent of update is not significantly different from zero in the Complexity treatment. However, the 
positive and significant maths ability coefficient means that there is an indirect updating effect.
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Fig. 10  Estimated probability of updating. (Fig. 2 as a bin scatter plot; number of bins = 10.)
Fig. 11  Change in guess: raw, and as a proportion of a Bayesian benchmark; By treatment. This figure 
corresponds to Fig. 3 in the main text, using kernel densities to distinguish the treatments. As in Fig. 3, 
the top panels show the raw size of updates on receiving a ball of each color, and the bottom panels show 
the proportional size of the updates on receiving a ball of each colour
 T. Henckel et al.
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Supplementary Information The online version contains supplementary material available at https:// doi. 
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